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BILINGUAL NOTICE-THE RIGHTS OF NON-ENGLISH
SPEAKING WELFARE RECIPIENTS
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the extent to which the
fourteenth amendment protects the rights of non-English-speaking citizens.'
As a consequence, litigation involving this question has increased significantly,2
particularly in such contexts as voting and welfare. One aspect of the question
of the rights of non-English-speaking citizens in the welfare area was recently
considered by the California Supreme Court.8
Plaintiffs were Spanish-speaking recipients of welfare payments, who sought
to enjoin California's Welfare Department from notifying Spanish-speaking wel-
fare recipients in English of a reduction or termination of welfare payments.4
The plaintiffs asserted that this practice was unconstitutional under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although they expressly admitted
that there were no cases directly supporting their position, the plaintiffs based
their claim on the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly,7 which held
that welfare recipients were entitled, under the due process clause, to a fair
hearing before their welfare grants could be terminated. Plaintiffs further argued
that they had been denied the equal protection of the laws, because the Cali-
fornia practice had created a class of non-English-speaking welfare recipients
1. See, e.g., Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 350 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Ill.
1972), aff'd, No. 73-1035 (7th Cir., Dec. 18, 1973). It has been assumed arguendo that all
of the plaintiffs involved in these various cases are citizens. Whether this distinction is Im-
portant in view of the fourteenth amendment rights granted to aliens is debatable. See, e.g.,
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). For recent cases dealing with the
problems of aliens see, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (term national
origin does not include citizenship requirements) ; In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (state
cannot refuse admission to its bar to aliens); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)
(state may not flatly ban aliens from competitive positions in its civil service); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (violation of equal protection to deny welfare benefits to
aliens). A good general discussion of the problems in this area may be found in Leibowitz,
English Literacy: Legal Sanction for Discrimination, 45 Notre Dame Law. 7 (1969).
2. See, e.g., Chavez v. San Francisco, No. C-73-1130-SC (N.D. Cal., filed July 5, 1973),
summarized at 7 Clearinghouse Rev. 340 (1973) (Spanish-speaking mechanic claims exami-
nation discriminates against those whose native language is not English) ; Sanchez v. Norton,
No. 15732 (D. Conn., filed Apr. 18, 1973), summarized at 7 Clearinghouse Rev. 178-79
(1973) (bilingual assistance in Spanish for welfare recipients) ; Aspira of New York, Inc. v.
Board of Educ., 58 F.R.D. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (bilingual education); Asoclacion'Mixta Pro-
gresista v. HEW, No. C-72-882 SAW (N.D. Cal., filed May 16, 1972), summarized at
6 Clearinghouse Rev. 452 (1972) (lack of bilingual personnel).
3. Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 512 P.2d 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201, cert. denied, 94
S. Ct. 883 (1973). A similar issue was raised in New York in the context of eviction from
public housing in Morales v. Golar, 75 Misc. 2d 157, 347 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
4. 9 Cal. 3d at 809, 512 P.2d at 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
S. Id. at 810, 512 P.2d at 834, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
6. Id.
7. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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who were discriminated against because they had been denied welfare payments
due to improper notification 8
Following the refusal of the Los Angeles Superior Court to grant such an in-
junction, the plaintiffs appealed.9 The California Supreme Court affirmed, hold-
ing that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment had not been
violated since it would not be unreasonable to assume that upon receipt of an
official notice from the Welfare Department an individual logically would
arrange for its translation.' 0 Based on its holding on the due process question,
the California court also concluded that the state had not violated the equal
protection clause by creating a specific class comprised of individuals whose wel-
fare payments were improperly terminated due to failure to give notice in a
language intelligible to them." Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 512 P.2d
833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 883 (1974).
The broader question raised by Guerrero-the extent of the rights of non-
English-speaking citizens-has been presented to the courts in such diverse
situations as voting,'2 education,' 3 unemployment insurance' 4 and consumer
affairs,' 5 as well as welfare. Furthermore, since most of the cases in these areas
involved only specific language groups'0 and did not involve the question of
non-English-speaking citizens in general, such decisions have not been uniform
and their precedential value is limited.' 7 Thus, for example, relief that was
granted to Mexican-Americans,' 8 may not have been granted to other non-
English-speaking Americans. The problem has been complicated further by the
8. 9 Cal. 3d at 814, 512 P.2d at 837, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
9. Id. at 809, 512 P.2d at 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
10. Id. at 814, 512 P.2d at 837, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
11. Id.
12. E.g., Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 350 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. TI.
1972), aft'd, No. 73-1035 (7th Cir., Dec. 18, 1973). See notes 21-29 infra and accompanying
text.
13. E.g., Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972). See
notes 30-48 infra and accompanying text.
14. Carmona v. Sheffield, 325 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 475 F.2d 738 (9th
Cir. 1973). The federal government is also concerned with the employment problems of the
Spanish-speaking in the federal civil service. Hearings on Federal Employment Problems of
the Spanish Speaking Before the Subcomm. on Civil Rights Oversight of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 26, 1-170 (1972).
15. See notes 55-57 infra and accompanying text.
16. This is primarily due to the fact that many of these cases involve class actions, and
the class cannot be so diverse that the courts will dismiss the action on this ground. Lopez
Tijerina v. Henry, 48 F.R.I. 274 (D.N.M. 1969), appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 922 (1970)
(Indo-Hispano--too vague a class to be meaningful). But see, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 94 S.
Ct. 786 (1974), rev'g 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973) (Chinese students) ; Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 197 (1973) (Hispanic students); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,
477-80 (1954) (Mexican-Americans distinct class for purposes of representation on a jury) ;
17. This is particularly true of cases involving Puerto Ricans; the courts can distinguish
them as citizens by birth under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a) (38), 1402 (1970).
18. Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279, 1282-83 (D.N.M. 1972).
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argument that the United States is an English-speaking country1" and that
fluency in English is required before an individual can be naturalized.20 This
argument, which conspicuously fails to take into account, inter alia, the con-
stitutional rights of citizens born in the United States who do not speak English,
has been raised frequently in proceedings involving non-English-speaking persons.
The first case in the area was set in the context of voting rights and dealt
primarily with the rights of Puerto Ricans.2 1 This case upheld the right of
Congress to enact section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which stated,
in effect, that Puerto Ricans, who were literate in Spanish but not in English,
could not be denied the right to vote.22 More recently, the voting rights of non-
English-speaking citizens were expanded still further by the courts. 23 For exam-
ple, one court has issued an injunction requiring the preparation, distribution
and display of Spanish language materials at polling places,24 basing its decision
on the fact that "the right to vote effectively which is guaranteed ... by federal
law would otherwise be seriously impaired .... ."2 In another case, the court
ordered bilingual ballots and sufficient interpreters to be available in any area in
which Spanish-speaking voters made up five percent or more of the voting
population. 26 Following this opinion, Connecticut chose to institute bilingual
elections in areas containing a given percentage of Spanish voters. 27
Such decisions clearly indicate that non-English-speaking citizens have a
right to participate intelligently in the election process. Moreover, since the right
to vote has been adjudged to be a fundamental right,28 the state must demon-
strate a compelling interest in order to justify laws that substantially infringe
upon voting rights.2 9 However, inasmuch as other aspects of the rights of non-
English-speaking persons-such as welfare-have not yet been determined to
be fundamental rights, it is not clear to what extent the decisions in the area
of voting rights may prove relevant in later cases.
19. Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 786 (1974). See
Leibowitz, English Literacy: Legal Sanction for Discrimination, 45 Notre Dame Law. 7, 8
(1969).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1423(1) (1970).
21. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
22. Id.; see United States v. County Bd. of Elections, 248 F. Supp. 316 (W.D.N.Y.
1965), appeal dismissed, 383 U.S. 575 (1966). See also 111 Cong. Rec. 11061 (1965) (remarks
of Senator Long on French-speaking citizens of Louisiana).
23. See, e.g., Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970)
(citizens literate in Spanish but not in English not required to take literacy test In English).
24. Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 350 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. I1. 1972),
aff'd, No. 73-1035 (7th Cir., Dec. 18, 1973).
25. Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
26. Torres v. Sachs, 73-Civ.-3921 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1973) (preliminary injunction), dis-
cussed in N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1973, at 1, cols. 2-3.
27. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1973, at 14, col. 5.
28. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 561-62 (1964).
29. For a discussion of this test see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627-633 (1969),
which held that the denial of welfare benefits to indi-iiduals who had resided in the state
(Vol. 42
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Results in areas other than voting indicate a growing concern with the rights
of non-English-speaking citizens. For example, recent cases in the field of non-
discriminatory education reveal a judicial recognition that non-English-speaking
students are entitled to the protection of the fourteenth amendment. Although
formerly there had been only a few such decisions, enjoining discriminatory prac-
tices against Mexican-Americans in the Southwest,3 0 recently the courts have
specifically extended the rights to education set forth in Brown v. Board of
Education,31 to members of other minority groups.3- In these decisions the
courts have emphasized the applicability of Brown to situations other than those
involving race. In Cisneros v. School District,33 for example, the court stated
that:
Brown... mean[s] that when a state undertakes to provide public school education,
this education must be made available to all students on equal terms, and that segrega-
tion of any group of children in such public schools on the basis of their being of a
particular race, color, national origin, or of some readily identifiable, ethnic-minority
group, or class deprives these children of the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment .... Although these cases speak in terms of race and color, we must remember
that these cases were only concerned with blacks and whites. But it is dear to this
court that these cases are not limited to race and color alone.3 4
Following these cases, the courts have used the guidelines established by the
Supreme Court35 to decide whether a school district is segregated, and have
ordered desegregation of schools populated primarily by students of Hispanic
background. 36 At the same time, as a means of enabling such non-English-
for less than a year was not justified by a compelling state interest. See generally Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1969). Recent cases in the
area of voting seem to be applying a test that is somewhere between strict scrutiny and
rational basis. See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Rosario v. Rockefeller,
410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 326, 328 (1973). See also
O'Brien v. Skinner, 94 S. CL 740, 745 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
30. Gonzales v. Sheely, 96 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (D. Ariz. 1951); Mendez v. Westminister
School Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544, 551 (S.D. Cal. 1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
However, neither of these decisions is as far-reaching as later ones. For example, in Gon-
zales, the court held that separate classrooms for students who have language deficiencies
could be justified after proper examination of these students. 96 F. Supp. at 1009. Congress
recently has concerned itself with the problems involved in the education of the Spanish-
speaking, particularly the problems of Mexican-Americans in the Southwest. See Hearings
on Reports of the U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights on the Educ. of the Spanish Speaking Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Civil Rights Oversight of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 35, 1-103 (1972).
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (non-discrimination as to blacks).
32. Cisneros v. School Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599, 604-05 (S.D. Tex. 1970), modified, 467
F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920, 922 (1973). See also Montoya, Bi-
lingual-Bicultural Education: Making Equal Educational Opportunities Available to Na-
tional Origin Minority Students, 61 Geo. L.J. 991, 999-1004 (1973).
33. 324 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
34. Id. at 604-05 (footnotes omitted).
35. See, e.g., Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
36. E.g., Cisneros v. School Dist., 324 F. Supp. at 617-20 & n.58.
1974]
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speaking students to participate in the educational process, some courts also
have begun to order the implementation of specialized bilingual programs in
these schools. 37
The question of whether there is a constitutional right of non-English-speaking
students to receive bilingual education has not yet been decided. In the past
year, a number of groups have argued that the failure of a school system to
provide bilingual education is a violation of the fourteenth amendment on the
ground that such students have been denied equal educational opportunities
because of their inability to speak English. 8 Although at least one court has held
that there is no constitutional right to a bilingual education,8 9 the Supreme
Court recently held that Chinese-American students in San Francisco are entitled
to English language instruction.40 The Court based its decision not on equal
protection grounds but on § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,'41 which bans
discrimination in any program that receives federal assistance, and on an HEW
directive which stated that school districts must take steps to rectify language
deficiencies.42 In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court considered the
effect on the Chinese students involved, rather than the purpose for not teaching
them English.43 The Court further noted that it is "obvious that the Chinese-
speaking minority receives less benefits than the English-speaking majority from
respondents' school system which denies them a meaningful opportunity to par-
ticipate in the educational program . . . ,,44 This application of § 601 in the
area of bilingual education does not indicate whether the arguments based on the
section in contexts other than education involving non-English-speaking citizens
will be similarly successful. However, the Federal Government has recognized the
particular problems of the non-English-speaking student and-via the Bilingual
Education Act 45 -has intervened and attempted to alleviate them. This statute,
furthermore, is not limited to Spanish-speaking groups, but includes within its
scope all non-English-speaking groups.40 The Bilingual Education Act and the
aforementioned decisions suggest an implicit recognition on the part of Congress
and the courts that the rights of non-English-speaking persons should not be
diminished by virtue of a language disability. In a recent decision, however,
37. Such programs include the hiring of Spanish-speaking teachers, Serna v. Portales Mu-
nicipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279, 1282 (D.N.M. 1972), and the teaching of both Spanish
and English in the schools, see, e.g., United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24, 30 (E.D. Tex.
1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1972).
38. E.g., Morales v. Shannon, 366 F. Supp. 813, 821 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
39. Id. at 824.
40. Lau v. Nichols, 94 S. Ct. 786 (1974), rev'g 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970).
42. 94 S. Ct. at 788. See also Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 58 F.R.D. 62,
65 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), where the same argument was raised. For HEW regulation relied on by
the plaintiffs see 35 Fed. Reg. 11595 (1970).
43. 94 S. Ct. at 788-89.
44. Id. at 789.
45. 20 U.S.C. §§ 880b to 880b-5 (1970).
46. Leibowitz, The Imposition of English as the Language of Instruction in American
Schools, 38 Revista de Derecho Puertorriquefio 175, 234-40 (1970).
[Vol. 42
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the Court rejected the contention that education is a fundamental right.47 On the
other hand, since the Court has stated that "education is perhaps the most im-
portant function of state and local governments, 48 the precedential value of
the cases in the area of education for cases such as Guerrero is unclear.
A number of other recent cases, of more limited scope than voting or education
rights in which certain aspects of the rights of non-English-speaking citizens
have been drawn into question, suggest that the welfare situation posed in
cases such as Guerrero will come under renewed judicial scrutiny. One of these
involved the question of the right in a criminal trial to a state-appointed inter-
preter. Although this question has been raised frequently, it has never been
clarified fully by the courts.4 9 Traditionally, the appointment of such an inter-
preter has been left to the discretion of the trial judge.? However, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that due process requirements
give a defendant with a severe language disability the right to have a com-
petent translator assist him throughout his trial at state expense.51
The issue of the rights of non-English-speaking persons has also been raised
with regard to state unemployment benefits in Carmona v. Sheffield.?'- There,
plaintiffs asserted they had been denied equal protection of the laws because
various aspects of the state unemployment insurance program were carried out
only in English. Basing its decision on the finding that it was reasonable for
California to use only English in conducting its state unemployment affairs, the
district court dismissed the action under rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 53 In its decision, the court also stated that relief in this area
must be granted by legislative actionPra
In the consumer field, there has been a growing movement toward legislation
requiring the expansion of polylingual notification. The Uniform Consumer
Credit Code takes cognizance of the problems encountered by non-English-
speaking citizens in its provisions concerning unconscionable agreements and
contracts.O5 In this it follows the leading case in this area, Frostifres Corp. v.
Reynoso,58 in which a New York court held as unconscionable a contract writ-
47. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-3$, 37 (1973).
48. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). This statement is quoted in
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29. See also 411 U.S. at 30 and cases cited.
49. United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889, 901 (2d Cir. 1967), afi'd, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
See generally Note, The Right to an Interpreter, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 145 (1970).
50. E.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 424 F.2d 205, 206 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
841 (1970) ; Suarez v. United States, 309 F.2d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 1962).
51. United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1970). See
also H.R. 7728 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (proposed Bilingual Courts Act, which would
provide for bilingual court facilities and personnel in given districts, which contain either
five percent or 50,000 persons who do not understand English, whichever is less).
52. 325 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1971), afPd, 475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973).
53. Id. at 1343.
54. Id. at 1342.
55. Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 5.108 & Comment 2, § 6.111 & Comment 3.
56. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Nassau Cty. Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd as to damage,
1974]
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ten and signed in English, where the terms had been negotiated in Spanish, and
the buyer was literate only in Spanish. Further, the Federal Trade Commission
now requires that when foreign-language advertising and sales materials are used,
and when affirmative disclosure of certain information is required of advertisers,
these disclosures must be in the same language as the advertisements or sales
materials. 57
Any consideration of the rights of non-English-speaking citizens in the area
of welfare must begin with the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly."
There, the Court held that welfare recipients were entitled to a hearing before
their welfare benefits could be terminated.59 At the same time, Goldberg effec-
tively eliminated the concept that welfare was a privilege, 0 "a 'gratuity' fur-
nished by the state, and thus . . . made subject to whatever conditions the
state sees fit to impose."'- Since Goldberg,62 the courts have expanded the right
of welfare recipients so as to require a fair hearing before the state can reduce
or terminate payments,63 regardless of whether the state's decision was based on
54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1967). See also Chavez v. Sunnyvale Dodge,
Inc., No. C-72-1517 CLR (NJD. Cal., filed Aug. 18, 1972), summarized at 6 Clearinghouse
Rev. 492 (1972) (complaint filed under Truth in Lending Act by a non-English-speaking
person who alleges violation of this act because he was provided with a contract in English).
Spanish translation of certain terms such as cash price and unpaid balance which are required
by Regulation Z of the Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-226.1002 (1973), have
been approved. 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide II 30,918 (1973).
57. 38 Fed. Reg. 21494-95 (1973). As still another indication of a developing concern
with the problems of the non-English-speaking consumer, see New York Court Rules §
2900.2(e) (3) (McKinney Supp. July, 1973) (statutory requirement that summons forms in
Spanish and English be served in actions involving consumer transactions).
58. 397 US. 254 (1970), noted in Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-Foreword:
Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 100-08 (1970);
19 De Paul L. Rev. 552 (1970); 16 Vill. L. Rev. 587 (1971). See also K. Davis, Administra-
tive Law Treatise § 7.08 (Supp. 1970); O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: The
Welfare Prior Hearing Cases, 1970 Sup. Ct. Rev. 161, 165-68. The holding in Goldberg was
incorporated into California case law in McCullough v. Terzian, 2 Cal. 3d 647, 650-51, 470
P.2d 4, 5-6, 87 Cal. Rptr. 195, 196-98 (1970).
59. 397 U.S. at 264.
60. See id. at 262, citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969). Prior to
the decision, the courts had developed various techniques to avoid applying this distinction
between rights and privileges. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction
in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439, 1451-54 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Van
Alstyne].
61. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 Yale
L.J. 1245 (1965). See O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior
Hearing Cases, 1970 Sup. Ct. Rev. 161, 163-64; 19 De Paul L. Rev. 552, 555-63 (1970). See
generally Van Alstyne.
62. The companion case to Goldberg, Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970),
held that a fair hearing was required before any termination of old age benefits,
63. Daniel v. Goliday, 398 U.S. 73 (1970) (per curiam).
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factual or policy reasons. 64 Under other decisions, federal regulations"a which
apply to such hearings have been held mandatory on the states.ea
The court in Guerrero, in deciding the narrow issue involved-the right of
non-English-speaking welfare recipients to receive notification in their own
language of any proposed termination of their benefits--stated that the essen-
tial question was not whether this type of notice was adequate to satisfy due
process, but whether those receiving such notice would be likely to seek a trans-
lation. 7 Speaking for the court, Justice Mosk concluded that it was likely that
such persons would obtain a translation, and, therefore, that this type of notice
satisfied the requirements of due process.s Relying upon the traditional argu-
ment that the United States is an English-speaking country,69 the court said
that there should be an incentive for non-English-speaking persons either to learn
English or to obtain translations. The court further argued that to support
the plaintiff's position would eventually mean that the principle of non-English
notification would have to be extended to official communications to all non-
English-speaking language groups. The subsequent burden on the state, accord-
ing to the court, would be overwhelming.7° Finally, Justice Mosk discussed the
California practices which insured that Spanish-speaking recipients would obtain
a fair hearing prior to termination of their welfare grants, e.g., the appointment
of an interpreter at the hearing, the use of bilingual social workers whenever
possible, and the printing of some welfare forms in Spanish.7'
64. Yee-Litt v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Cal.), affd sub nom. Carleson v.
Yee-Litt, 412 U.. 924 (1973). The right to a fair hearing has been extended beyond the
area of welfare. See, e.g., Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972) (per curiam) (disability
benefits); Java v. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev., 317 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Cal.
1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 121 (1971) (unemployment benefits). The effects of this decision can
also be seen in many other areas, see, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (hearing
required before revocation of parole); Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425
F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970) (eviction from public housing). See also
United States ex. rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973).
65. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1973).
66. Guerrero v. Schmidt, 352 F. Supp. 789, 793 (W.D. Wis. 1973); Jeffries v. Swank, 337
F. Supp. 1062, 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
67. 9 Cal. 3d at 812, 512 P2d at 835, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
68. Id. at 814, 512 P.2d at 837, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 205. However, it has been noted that
"[wlelfare recipients are often ignorant of their rights to a 'fair hearing." The Supreme
Court, 1969 Term, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 105 (1970) (footnote omitted). Thus, it is difficlt to
accept the court's argument that such recipients would have such notices translated. See also
Note, El Derecho de Aviso: Due Process and Bilingual Notice, 83 Yale LJ. 385, 391-93
(1973).
69. 9 Cal. 3d at 812, 512 P.2d at 835, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 203. See Lau v. Nichols, 94
S. Ct. 786, 791 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also text accompanying note 19 supa.
70. 9 Cal. 3d at 816, 512 P.2d at 838, 109 Cal Rptr. at 206. But see note 75 infra and
accompanying text.
71. 9 Cal. 3d at 816-17, 512 P.2d at 838-39, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 206-07. For methods adopted
by other states see State of Connecticut Welfare Department, Departmental Bull No. 2795,
19741
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In Guerrero, the court was faced with an attempt to extend still further the
requirements of due process as applied to welfare recipients. The California
court, however, made no real attempt to analyze this case in terms of the deci-
sion in Goldberg. Instead, it relied upon the fact that Goldberg did not directly
support the plaintiffs' due process contention, since, although some of the wel-
fare recipients in Goldberg had Spanish surnames, the Supreme Court stated
that the form and content of the notice, which was in English, was adequate.72
However, in Goldberg, the Court did not consider the question of the language
in which such notification must be given. Thus, in Guerrero, the California court
failed to confront the crucial element in Goldberg: that welfare is of critical
importance to the recipient in that it provides the very bases of life, such as
food and housing. 73 Furthermore, "[s]ince [the welfare recipient] lacks inde-
pendent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to con-
centrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects
his ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy." 74 Since welfare pay-
ments are so important to the recipient, it would appear to be unreasonable
for the state to refuse to inform a recipient, in language comprehensible to the
latter, of the termination of welfare payments on the policy grounds that notifi-
cation in the recipient's own language would place too great a burden upon the
state. It would appear that the state should be required to carry this burden. 70
Delivery of Departmental Services to Non-English Speaking Applicants and Recipients, Sept.
5, 1973, on file with the Fordham Law Review; 6 Clearinghouse Rev. 33-34 (1972) (New
Jersey translates welfare forms into Spanish and hires bilingual caseworkers).
72. 9 Cal. 3d at 810-11, 512 P.2d at 834, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 202. See Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970).
73. 397 U.S. at 264.
74. Id. (footnote omitted).
75. A corollary argument has been raised in the area of equal protection. In Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), the Supreme Court held that the state could not justify a law
which discriminated against women administrators on the ground that It decreased the work-
load of the state's probate court. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-38 (1969)
(which is distinguishable because the fundamental right to travel was involved), the Su-
preme Court also rejected this argument. In the area of due process, the same argument
was rejected in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971) and in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (wherein the lower court's disposition of that case sub nom. Kelly
v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) was quoted). See also Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791, 799-800 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave dates not Justi-
fied by administrative convenience).
Undercutting the thesis that the state should carry this burden Is the recent decision In
Kuri v. Edelman, No. 74-1093 (7th Cir. Feb. 11, 1974). There the plantiffs sought declara-
tory and injunctive relief from Illinois' welfare program which, in effect, terminates assistance
to recipients who fail to return information cards printed in English or follow the procedure
in the suspension notice which is also in English and is sent to the recipient upon his failure
to return these cards. In upholding the district court's denial of plaintiffs' petition, the court
found inapposite Lau v. Nichols, 94 S. Ct. 786 (1974) (see notes 105-13 and accompanying
text). Relying on Guerrero as "comparable to the case at bar" the court failed to find a
"basis for granting the extraordinary relief requested." Slip. op. at 6.
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However, in this context, the number of non-English-speaking welfare recipients
who require bilingual notification would have to be considered in the determina-
tion.7 6 The fact that notification in other languages besides Spanish might be re-
quired would not, it would seem, place an undue burden on the state, since
procedures could be developed to minimize administrative difficulties.
Avoiding this problem, Justice Mosk dealt with the due process question in
Guerrero in terms of the ability of the plaintiffs to understand and to obtain
a translation of any such notification. 7 In so doing, he failed to analyze the
question of the right of a welfare recipient to be notified in a language intelligible
to him and to take into account the Supreme Court's statement that "the right
to due process reflects a fundamental value in our American constitutional sys-
tem."78 This right includes an opportunity to be heard,79 and proper notification
is an essential part of that right.80 In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co.,81 the Supreme Court set forth the requirements for notification: "An
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding...
is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise inter-
ested parties of the pendency of the action ...... a- In Guerrero, however, the
court analyzes these requirements for notice only in terms of the reasonable
nature of the state's expectation that a welfare recipient will obtain a transla-
tion of such notice.83 Even if Mu/ane can be analyzed as requiring a balancing
between the interests of the state and those of the individual, 84 it can be argued,
76. Lau v. Nichols, 94 S. Ct. 786, 790-91 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
77. 9 Cal. 3d at 814, 512 P.2d at 837, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
78. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
79. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 178 (1951) (Douglas,
J., concurring). Since Goldberg, the Court has analyzed due process questions as follows:
the Court first decides if the interest involved is "one within the contemplation of the
'liberty of property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment," Morrissey v. Brewer, 403
U.S. 471, 481 (1972); if so the Court then balances the government's interests against
that of the individual. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US. 254, 262-66 (1970). For recent
cases discussing this process see, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 US. 593 (1972); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 US. 564, 569-70 (1972). One of the ways that the Court finds such
an interest is through statutory entitlement. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 403 U.S. 564
(1972), the Court said "the welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly . . . had a claim of
entitlement to welfare payments that was grounded in the statute defining eligibility for
them." Id. at 577. In Guerrero, statutory entitlement might be claimed under 45 C.F.R.
§ 205.10 (1973). See note 65 supra and accompanying text. See generally Note, Procedural
Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 880, 887-93 (1973).
80. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1956) (notice to an incompetent);
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-16 (1950) (notice by pub-
lication); Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908) (right to be notified of a
hearing before tax assessment fixed).
81. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
82. Id. at 314.
83. 9 Cal. 3d at 812-15, 512 P.2d at 835-37, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 203-OS.
84. See Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 Harv.
L. Rev. 426, 434 (1973).
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just as easily, that notice in a language unintelligible to its reader would cer-
tainly not meet the Mullane requirements. Moreover, it does not follow that the
ability to receive a fair hearing should depend upon the welfare recipient's ability
to procure a competent translation. The importance of considering the particular
factual circumstances when welfare recipients are involved was recognized
by the Supreme Court in Goldberg when it stated:
The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of
those who are to be heard. It is not enough that a welfare recipient may present his
position to the decision maker in writing .... Written submissions are an unrealistic
option for most recipients, who lack the educational attainment necessary to write
effectively and who cannot obtain professional assistance.80
As Justice Tobriner noted as the lone dissenter in Guerrero, the non-English-
speaking welfare recipient may neither understand the need for, nor be able
to obtain, a translation."0
The court's discussion of the ad hoc procedures that have arisen in California
to provide fairer treatment in the judicial or administrative process to non-
English-speaking persons illustrates the need for a definitive court decision
in this area. Although provisions made by the state8 7 for such aids as social
workers assigned to specific clients, Spanish-language forms, and/or translators
are clearly of assistance to Spanish-speaking individuals, the failure to provide
such assistance on a mandatory and consistent basis renders such assistance less
than fully reliable. The decision as to who is eligible for these services is, under
the California practice, effectively left to the discretion of a governmental ad-
ministrator. As the court said in Guerrero, these practices are "good-faith efforts
.. . to do as much as can reasonably be done-within the limits of budget,
staffing, and time-to insure that recipients who are not fluent in English are
not deprived of their welfare rights solely because of their language handicap."88
Even where the requirements of due process and fair hearing have been man-
dated by the state or federal government, "due process guarantees ... can be
vitiated . . . .This can be done by discrepancies between theory and prac-
tice .... The prior hearing required by Goldberg can be redndered [sic] inef-
fective by county and state policies which discourage claimants from seek-
ing aid pending a hearing."189 Such guarantees are even more ineffective when,
as here, they are not mandated but are left to the discretion of state admin-
istrators.9
85. 397 U.S. at 268-69 (footnote omitted).
86. 9 Cal. 3d at 821, 512 P.2d at 842, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
87. See id. at 816-17, 512 P.2d at 838-39, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 206-07.
88. Id. at 817, 512 P.2d at 839, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
89. Comment, California Welfare Fair Hearings: an Adequate Remedy?, 5 U. Cal.,
Davis L. Rev. 542, 558 (1972) (footnote omitted).
90. The California procedures for communicating with welfare recipients in Spanish
are detailed at 9 Cal. 3d at 816-17 & n.10, 512 P.2d at 838-39 & n.10, 109 Cal. Rptr. at
206-07 & n.10. A discussion of the fair hearing regulations can be found at 9 Cal. 3d at
810, 816 & n.11, 512 P.2d at 833-34, 838 & n.11, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 201-02, 206 & n.11. These
may be compared with the federal requirements, see note 65 supra, and with the New York
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Plaintiffs also argued in Guerrero that the California procedure had denied
them the equal protection of the law by arbitrarily creating a class of welfare
recipients who did not receive proper notification of the right to a hearing. This
argument might have been more persuasive had they argued that, under the
rational basis test set forth in Reed v. Reed,91 the issue was whether or not
California could justify a procedure that created two classes of welfare recipi-
ents--one which spoke English, and the other which didn't speak English-
on the basis of increased administrative burdens. The plaintiffs, however, were
faced with the problem that in the context of economic and social welfare, the
"rational basis" test has usually been applied in such a way as to uphold the
state's particular application of its regulatory powers.02 Instead, they relied
on the leading California case in the context of voting or literacy tests, Castro
v. State, 3 which held that it was impermissible to give literacy tests in English
to those literate only in Spanish.94 Justice Mosk, however, held that plaintiffs'
reliance on Castro was misplaced, since in Castro the court had rejected specif-
ically the notion that the state was required to provide bilingual ballots and
election materials.P5 The court in Guerrero also stated that Castro was dis-
tinguishable because the right to vote, unlike the right to welfare payments, has
State requirements for a fair hearing, 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358 (1972). Although the New York
rules contain detailed regulations regarding information to be given to recipients, 18
N.Y.C.R.R. § 355.1 (1968), and the type of notification to be given prior to a hearing, 18
N.Y.C.R.R. § 358.11 (1972), no mention is made of the necessity for notification in a lan-
guage other than English. Thus, the issue raised in California by Guerrero might also be
raised in New York, given its large Spanish-speaking population. See 9 Cal. 3d at 811,
512 P.2fd at 834, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
91. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Under this test "[a] classification 'must be reasonable, not arbi-
trary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike." Id. at 76. The advantage to the plaintiffs of having a court apply this test is that
statutes adjudged according to this test have been found to violate the equal protection
clause, without the plaintiffs in these cases being forced to prove that a suspect class or
fundamental right is involved. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Pro-
tection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8-48 (1972); Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An
Analysis and a Proposal, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 605, 614-38 (1973) thereinafter cited as Equal
Protection].
92. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (New York's home visitation program rea-
sonable administrative tool); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (reasonable
basis test applied in area of "economic and social welfare" to uphold maximum limit on
welfare grant). See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 US. 78 (1971) (rational basis found for
reduction of social security benefits by amount paid by workmen's compensation). See
generally Equal Protection 629-30. This test is set forth in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
93. 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970).
94. Id. at 242-43, 466 P.2d at 258-59, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 34-35. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 118 (1970), the Supreme Court held that Congress had the power to abolish the
use of literacy tests as a requirement to vote.
95. 9 Cal. 3d at 814-15, 512 P.2d at 837, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
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already been judicially declared a "fundamental right", thus requiring the
state to show a compelling interest to justify its regulatory authority.
Thus far, decisions concerning different aspects of the broad area of the
rights of non-English-speaking citizens have been confined to the specific groups
and particular problems involved in each case. As the court noted in Guerrero,
however, a holding in any aspect of this area may reach far beyond the specific
factual situation involved. 7 A decision in one aspect may affect and strengthen
the arguments made in another.98 It is, therefore, important to analyze the
decision in Guerrero in terms of its effect upon future cases, not only in the
specific context of welfare but also in the broader context of the rights of non-
English-speaking persons in general. Given a factual situation in which there
has not been a determination that a fundamental right or suspect classification
is involved, 99 non-English-speaking citizens will, it appears, have to rely upon
the "new" equal protection test set forth in Reed v. Reed,10 and other recent
decisions.'"' Under this test, "[t]he 'desirability' of the end, and the effective-
ness of the statute in accomplishing it are being balanced against the impact or
burden which the classification imposes upon the members of the named
class."'1 0 2 Guerrero, however, demonstrates that this test may not always be
applied. As a result, plaintiffs in welfare cases have had to develop other ap-
proaches,10 3 and the situation is likely to continue.'0 4
96. Id., 512 P.2d at 837, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 205; see notes 28-29 supra and accompanying
text.
97. 9 Cal. 3d at 815, 512 P.2d at 837-38, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 205-06.
98. See Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 Texas L. Rev. 411,
416 (1973) (discussing the impact of Goldberg).
99. Whether a court will ever hold that "all people who do not speak English" arc mem-
bers of a group defined by means of a suspect classification is doubtful.
100. 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see note 91 supra.
101. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974); United States
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537-38 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
446-47 (1972); cf. Equal Protection 614-31. But cf. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
102. Equal Protection 623.
103. Among the arguments that may be advanced is that a given governmental practice,
although appearing to be non-discriminatory, actually operates in a discriminatory manner In
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Brief for Plaintiff
at 16-20, Torres v. Sachs, 73-Civ.-3921 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1973). In some of these cases,
the court has not decided whether to apply the "rational basis" test or the "compelling state
interest" test, but has decided that the procedure violates the equal protection clause. See,
e.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1177 (2d Cir. 1972), in which a prima
fade case of de facto discrimination was found in the examination procedures for supervisory
positions in the New York City Board of Education. See also Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk
Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401
(D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), a school
desegregation case in which the court stated: "MWVe now firmly recognize that the arbitrary
quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public
interest as the perversity of a willful scheme." Id. at 497. But see Kennedy Park Homes
Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
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The recent Supreme Court decision in Lau v. Nichols'10 raises the possibility
that plaintiffs in a welfare context may be able to argue that, under § 601 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,106 and HEW regulations in the welfare area,"
the failure to provide bilingual notification to non-English-speaking welfare re-
cipients discriminates against them on the basis of national origin. Although
most of the decisions based on this section have been in the context of educa-
tion,'08 the legislative history of the act indicates that welfare was intended to be
included within this section.' 0 9 However, the applicability of § 601 to areas
other than education must still be determined. The decision in Lau suggests
two alternative formulations as to the scope of this section. First, it is possible
to argue that § 601, standing alone, may mandate that programs receiving fed-
eral assistance must take the necessary steps to guarantee that non-English-
speaking recipients are treated on an equal basis with English-speaking recip-
ients.110 Acceptance of this theory rests upon the premise that in passing § 601
Congress intended to create a mechanism for combatting discrimination in any
program that receives federal assistance."" If this premise is correct, the prob-
lem becomes one of determining the forms of discrimination prohibited by § 601.
However, if Congress intended by § 601 to ban discrimination based on national
origin, whether it might also be construed as intended to require bilingual notice
to non-English-speaking recipients of federal funds is questionable. Secondly,
the more probable interpretation of the extent of § 601 derives from the fact
that HEW had promulgated regulations regarding bilingual education and this
led to the Court's decision in Lau."- Thus, in the absence of specific guidelines,
§ 601 does not, either specifically or through inference, speak to the question
of bilingual notice. If this interpretation of Lau is correct, its significance in
areas other than education is problematic. For instance, in the area of welfare,
(1971), wherein the court held that the city must show a compelling state interest before
re-zoning property selected for low income housing to recreational use, when "invidious
discrimination guided the actions of the City." Id. at 109.
104. See Equal Protection 630 n.227.
105. Lau v. Nichols, 94 S. Ct 786 (1974).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970). This statute prohibits discrimination under federally
assisted programs on the ground of race, color or national origin. See also N.Y. Times, Dec.
2, 1973, § 1, at 41, col. 1 (HUD hearings on § 2000(d)). It would follow from this that non-
English-speaking welfare recipients, whose programs are federally assisted, see, e.g, 42 US.C.
§ 401 (1970), cannot be discriminated against because they do not speak English by such
state procedures as notification in English of the termination of their benefits.
107. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (b) (iii) (1973).
108. See, e.g., Edgar v. United States, 404 U.S. 1206 (1971); Adams v. Richardson, 480
F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
109. See 110 Cong. Rec. 6545 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). For cases involv-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) in the area of welfare, see, e.g., Gardner v. Alabama, 385 Fad 804
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1046 (1968); Lampton v. Bonin, 299 F. Supp. 336
(E.D. La. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S. 663 (1970).
110. Lau v. Nichols, 94 S. Ct. 786, 789 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring).
111. See 110 Cong. Rec. 6544-45 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
112. 94 S. Ct. at 788-89.
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the only similar regulation is concerned with "separate treatment in any mat-
ter related to his receipt of any service .... ."3 and whether this section would
mandate bilingual notice is, at best, debatable. However, it is possible that the
courts may interpret § 601 together with the above regulations to require bi-
lingual notification in a context such as that in Guerrero. If not, those who wish
to rely upon § 601 may have to turn their efforts to inducing the administrative
agencies involved to issue applicable regulations before they may use this argu-
ment in the courts.
In the area of due process, plaintiffs situated as were those in Guerrero have
available a much stronger argument. If they point out that such cases as Gold-
berg have held that the right to welfare is an "interest" within the meaning
of the due process clause, the courts should then weigh the interest of the non-
English-speaking person in receiving notification in his own language against
the state's interest in retaining English as its official language and in avoiding
administrative burdens and expenses which are asserted to be disproportionate
to the good achieved. Since courts frequently have rejected state arguments of
justification based on increased administrative costs,114 it is clear that the state
will bear a heavy burden in seeking to outweigh this essential individual inter-
est.115 As the Supreme Court said in Stanley v. Illinois:110
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process
Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vul-
nerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may
characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre
ones.
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized deter-
mination.117
Although the court in Guerrero held that the state had not denied due process
to the plaintiffs, the court did not apply the due process balancing test sug-
gested above. Had it done so, the outcome might well have been altered.
The resolution of the problem posed in Guerrero-the extent to which the due
process clause imposes on the state the obligation to provide official notices in
languages other than English-in effect justifies the continuation of the state's
limited ad hoc procedures, rather than requiring that fully effective procedures
be applied with consistency to all non-English-speaking welfare recipients. Al-
though this is a problem that may have to be resolved at least partially by leg-
islative action, it appears to be one that properly can be determined judicially.
As questions similar to those raised in Guerrero arise more frequently, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the courts will begin to expand the application of con-
stitutional guarantees to non-English-speaking citizens.
Judith R. MacDonald
113. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b) (iii) (1973).
114. See note 75 supra.
115. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 261-66.
116. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
117. Id. at 656-57.
